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SOLUTIONS FOR UNEASY NEIGHBORS: REGULATING THE
RESERVATION ENVIRONMENT AFTER Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989).
Abstract The United States Supreme Court's decision in Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes &Bands of Yakima Indian Nation undermines comprehensive land use planning in
some parts of Indian reservations and contributes to an environment of legal uncertainty
on reservations. The loss of effective land use planning on Indian reservations will have an
adverse impact on the interests of both tribal members and non-members. Extension of
Brendale to other forms of environmental regulation would have an even more detrimental
impact on the responsible development of reservations. This Note exposes the infeasibility
of Brendale and suggests a cooperative approach for resolving jurisdictional conflicts on
Indian reservations.

In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation,I the United States Supreme Court considered whether the
Yakima Indian Tribe had authority to zone non-member fee land
located on the Yakima Reservation. The results of Brendale's three
widely divergent opinions were Solomonic: tribes can zone non-member lands in some areas of the reservation, but not in other areas.
After a brief historical background, this Note analyzes Brendale'snegative impact on land use planning on Indian reservations. Next, the
author presents the compelling arguments in favor of continued
Indian authority to impose environmental regulation over all lands
within the reservation boundaries. Finally, this Note suggests alternatives to jurisdictional fights like those in Brendale. Cooperative agreements between local governments and tribes not only offer a more
equitable solution, but also more effectively promote the goals of land
use planning and environmental regulation.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Foundationsof Tribal Power

In Worcester v. Georgia,2 Chief Justice Marshall recognized the
principle of inherent Indian sovereignty when he rejected Georgia's
attempt to enforce state law over Cherokee country. After tracing
relations between Europeans and Native Americans in previous centuries, Marshall concluded that Indian nations are "distinct political
communities." 3
1. 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989).
2. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
3. Id. at 557.
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Since Worcester, federal Indian policy has often fallen far short of
the principles Marshall established. Initially, the federal government
adopted a policy of measured separatism by creating reservations
which were largely autonomous except for the supervision and support
of the federal government. 4 These homelands did not remain intact
long. In 1887 Congress passed the Dawes Act,5 also known as the
General Allotment Act, under which the government divided many
reservations into "allotments" for individual Indians and sold much of
the undivided land as "surplus land" to non-Indians.6 Indians, who
were inexperienced with land ownership and generally unenamored
with the idea of becoming like white farmers, often sold their lands
once alienation restrictions on their allotments lapsed.7 Although the
federal government reversed its allotment policy in 1934,8 the allotment process drastically diminished Indian land holdings. 9 On many
Indian reservations this created a patchwork of lands held in trust by
the federal government for tribes, allotted lands held in trust for tribal
members, fee land held by non-members, federal public land, and state
and county land.
In the late nineteenth century, tribal power waned as the federal
government exercised essentially unchecked power over the affairs of
Indians.' ° During the eclipse of tribal governments, the Supreme
Court often diminished tribal authority by allowing federal and state
governments to exercise their authority over Indians and their reservations. " With the advent of the self-determination policy of the 1960s
and 1970s, tribal governments have experienced a renaissance. 12 The
reawakening of tribal power has raised a thorny issue: To what extent
does tribal authority extend over the persons and property of the suc4. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW, 14 (1987).
5. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (West 1983). A mixture of
avarice and Indian assimilationist attitudes prompted the Allotment Act. See generally D. OTIS,
THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 8-32 (1973).
6. F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 666-71 (1984).
7. Id. at 865.
8. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-79 (West 1983).
9. The landholdings of tribes and individual Indians went from 138 million acres in 1887 to
48 million acres in 1934. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 138 (1982 ed.).
10. Id. at 143.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding congressional
authority to impose federal jurisdiction over Indians for "major crimes" committed on
reservations); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (allowing state jurisdiction over
the murder of a non-Indian by a non-Indian on a reservation without Congressional delegation).
12. A central part of this policy is that Indians should determine their own future. See H.R.
Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
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cessors of the non-Indians who ventured onto reservations during the
Allotment Era?
B.

Toward a Definition of the Limits of Tribal Authority: The
Montana Approach

Recently, the trend in the United States Supreme Court has been
toward limiting Indian authority to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 3 the
United States Supreme Court concluded that tribes lack authority to
exercise criminal authority over non-Indians. Soon afterwards, in
Montana v. United States,14 the Court limited tribal exercise of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations. In Montana, the Court
held that the Crow Tribe did not have authority to regulate hunting
and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands within the reservation."5 The Court laid down a general principle in Montana that,
absent congressional delegation, Indian authority did not extend
to protect tribal self-government or to con"beyond what is necessary
16
trol internal relations."
While creating a new presumption against tribal control over nonIndians, the Court in Montana did acknowledge two seemingly broad
exceptions under which tribes retain authority over non-Indians: first,
regulation of the activities of non-members engaged in consensual relations with Indians; second, regulation of conduct of non-Indians on fee
land when it "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."17
Although the scope of the second exception appears similar to the
traditional scope of police powers,"' the result in Montana indicates
that tribal authority over non-Indian lands was less than the full scope
of such powers. 9 Taken together, Oliphantand Montana are part of a
general trend toward restricting tribal authority primarily to matters
involving Indians and their property.2" The long interval in which
13. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
14. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
15. Id. at 563-67.
16. Id. at 564.
17. Id. at 566-67.
18. The police power has been defined as that "which enables the people to prohibit all things
inimical to comfort, safety, health and the welfare of society." Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C.
722, 143 S.E. 530, 536 (1928).
19. After all, the Crow Tribe's fishing and wildlife regulations, which are police power
regulations, did not fit within the exception. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
20. But see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980) (holding that Indian inherent powers are divested only when inconsistent with the
overriding interests of the national government).
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tribes did not exercise their power 2 and non-members' lack of the
right to vote in tribal elections probably weighed heavily against tribal
authority over non-members and their property.2 2
Nevertheless, after Montana, lower courts readily gave tribes
authority over non-Indians under the second Montana exception when
non-Indian activity affected the environment or vital resources on reservations.2 3 For example, the Ninth Circuit allowed Indian regulation
of non-Indian water use 24 and non-Indian riparian rights under the

second Montana exception.25 The Tenth Circuit upheld tribal zoning
authority over non-Indian fee land under the second Montana exception where there was no competing local or county ordinances restricting land use on non-Indian fee land.26
C.

The Brendale Decision

1. Facts of Brendale
Brendale consists of two separate cases consolidated on appeal. In
the first case, Philip Brendale, a part-Indian who is not a member of
the Yakima Tribe, sought to subdivide a twenty-acre parcel he owned
21. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9; Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1978).
22. Although unmentioned in either decision, the lack of political accountability to nonmembers was probably a strong argument against tribal authority over them or their property.
C. WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 214 n.126; see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 173 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "[s]ince nonmembers are excluded from
participation in tribal government, the powers that may be exercised over them are appropriately
limited").
23. Congress and the executive branch have also given Indians a greater role in developing
their own environmental programs on reservations. However, Congress expressly provided for
tribal authority over non-Indian lands in only a couple of statutes. See Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1987, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377 (West Supp. 1989); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7474(c) (West 1983). For an analysis of tribal authority
under federal statutes, see Pirtle, Morisset, Schlosser & Ayer, Implications of the Brendale
Opinion 20-25 (Aug. 14, 1989) (on file with Washington Law Review).
The Environmental Protection Agency has recognized tribes as having the primary authority
and responsibility for the reservation populace. Office of the Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental
Programs on Indian Reservations 2 (Nov. 8, 1984) [hereinafter EPA Policy] (on file with
Washington Law Review).
24. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981) (upholding tribal authority to regulate the use of surplus water by non-Indians on a
water system entirely within the reservation). But cf United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that Washington State, not the Spokane Tribe, may regulate non-Indian
use of surplus water on a creek which merely borders the reservation for a short distance).
25. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 977 (1982).
26. Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982).
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in fee into ten two-acre cabin sites.2 7 Brendale's land is located in
what the Tribe has designated as the "closed area" of the reservation.
Approximately three percent of this area is held in fee by non-members of the Tribe, and access to the general public has been restricted
since 1972.28 Brendale's proposed subdivision was consistent with
Yakima County zoning but conflicted with tribal zoning of the closed
area.

29

In the second case Stanley Wilkinson, a non-Indian, wished to subdivide thirty-two acres into twenty lots in the "open area" of the
Yakima Reservation. 0 Unlike the closed area, the percentage of nonmember fee land in the open area is substantial-nearly fifty percentand public access to lands in the open area is not restricted."1 Towns
in the open area, such as Toppenish, Wapato and Harrah, predominantly consist of non-member fee land.3 2 Like Brendale's, Wilkinson's
proposed subdivision, conformed to county, but not tribal zoning
ordinances.33
In separate actions brought by the Tribe to require compliance with
tribal zoning, the federal district court held that the Tribe had authority to zone non-member fee lands in the closed areas,34 but not in the
open areas.35 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first analyzed whether the Tribe had authority to zone non-member fee land.
The court held that such authority over both the open and closed
areas fell within the second Montana exception and therefore was per27. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994,
3001 (1989). In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) and Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Court discussed jurisdiction over non-Indians. In Brendale, the
Court applied the principles of these cases to determine Indian authority over the interests of a
broader class of individuals, namely non-members (both non-Indians and Indian non-members)
who own fee land.
28. Brendal 109 S. Ct. at 3000, 3012.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at

3001.
3002.
3000, 3016.
3000.

33. Id at 3002.
34. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wash. 1985), aff'd sub nor.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d. 529 (9th Cir.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nor. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
35. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Wash. 1985), rev'd sub nor.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529 (9th Cir.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nor. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
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missible.3 6 In doing so, the court implicitly equated the extent of
inherent Indian sovereignty with the limits of police power.3 7 The
Ninth Circuit further reasoned that Indian authority to zone the prop38
erty would advance the goal of systematic and coordinated planning.
The court went on to balance county and tribal interests to determine
whether there should be concurrent jurisdiction over non-member fee
lands.3 9 It found that the strength of tribal interests over the closed
area justified exclusive tribal zoning of Brendale's property and
remanded the case involving Wilkinson's property for the district
court to balance tribal and county interests in zoning non-member fee
4°
lands located in the open area.
2.

The United States Supreme Court's Three Separate Opinions in
Brendale

The United States Supreme Court issued a plurality, concurring and
dissenting opinion in Brendale. A plurality of four justices,4 1 joined by
two concurring justices,42 held that the Tribe lacked authority to zone
non-member lands in the open area. The two concurring justices,
however, joined the three dissenting4 3 justices to uphold tribal zoning
of non-member land in the closed area. Therefore, Brendale's net
result is that the Tribe retains the power to zone non-member lands in
the closed area of the reservation, but has lost the power to zone such
lands in the open area. Brendale did not affect tribal power over tribal
trust lands or allotted lands held in trust for tribal members.'
36. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1987), aff'd in partand rev'd in partsub nom. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
37. The Court reasoned that zoning was within the second Montana exception because
among zoning's purposes as a police power is the protection of the health and welfare of citizens.
Id. at 534.
38. Id. at 534-35.
39. Id. at 535.
40. Id. at 535-36.
41. Justice White wrote the plurality opinion with which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy joined. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
109 S.Ct. 2994, 2999 (1989).
42. Justice Stevens wrote the concurring opinion with which Justice O'Conner joined. Id. at
3009.
43. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. Id. at 3017.
44. Tribes retain exclusive power to regulate Indian trust lands, because state authority to
regulate such lands has "been preempted by extensive Federal policy and legislation." Santa
Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1038 (1977).
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a. Justice White's Plurality Opinion
Justice White followed Montana's general presumption against tribal authority over non-Indians. 5 Construing the second Montana
exception narrowly, Justice White concluded that a tribe's authority
does not extend over all conduct listed in the exception, but instead
Applying the second Montana
depends on the circumstances.4 6
authority
in
a very literal fashion, Justice
exception to tribal zoning
White concluded that a tribe has authority over a proposed land use
on non-Indian land only so long as it threatens a tribe.47 When the
threat of a proposed land use disappeared, Justice White reasoned that
control would revert to the non-Indian local government. Justice
White thought that this flip-flop of zoning authority would serve no
legitimate interests. Therefore, he denied tribes the authority to zone
non-member fee lands.4 8 Instead, he allowed them the right to sue to
enjoin uses which would have a demonstrably serious impact and
imperil their political integrity, economic security or their health and
welfare. 9 According to Justice White, congressional legislation can
modify the relative authority of tribes and local governments if this
arrangement does not adequately protect tribal interests.5"
b. Justice Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
Reading the second Montana exception broadly in light of earlier
precedent,"1 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the Yakima Tribe should
be able to zone all reservation fee land owned by non-members. 2
According to Justice Blackmun, the loss of the long term benefits of
comprehensive land management would have a significant enough
impact on tribal interests to justify tribal authority under the second
Montana exception.5 3 Once Justice Blackmun established that tribes
should have authority over non-member lands, he summarily rejected
45. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3006.
46. Id. at 3007.
47. Id. at 3007-08.
48. Id. at 3008.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 3009.
51. Id. at 3018-19 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980)).
52. Id. at 3023.
53. Id However, Justice Blackmun acknowledged the difficulty of determining whether the
Yakima Tribe would have an adequate interest to regulate land use in towns which consist
primarily of non-member fee lands. Id. at 3027 n.9.
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concurrent tribal/county zoning of non-member lands as being
unworkable. 4
c. Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens evaluated the authority of the Yakima Tribe to zone
non-member lands on the reservation on the basis of their power to
exclude." This power, which was once absolute, has been diminished
over time by Acts of Congress, such as the Allotment Act,56 and the
long hiatus in tribal regulation of non-members lands.
Applying this analysis, Justice Stevens concluded that the Yakima
57
Tribe has authority to zone Brendale's property in the closed area.
Critical to Justice Stevens' conclusion is the fact that non-members
own very little land in the closed area.5 8 Moreover, by restricting
access to the closed area, the Tribe has exercised its power to exclude,
thereby preserving "the power to define the essential character of that
area." 59 Throughout his opinion, Stevens also stressed the "pristine"
character of the closed area.6 °
Justice Stevens reached the opposite conclusion regarding Wilkinson's property in the open area. Justice Stevens concluded that the
Tribe lacks the power to zone non-member land in the open area, in
part because nearly fifty percent of the open area consists of non-member fee land, and because the Tribe has not retained its power to determine the essential character of the open area by restricting access to
61
it.
Justice Stevens alluded to several other factors in denying tribal
authority over non-member lands in the open area, including the fact
that non-members constitute eighty percent of the open area population but cannot vote in tribal elections.6 2
II. ANALYSIS OF BRENDALE
The results of the Brendale opinion are contrary to the fundamental
values of land use planning. Comprehensive planning is impossible
with two uncoordinated, independent bodies regulating land use on
54. Id. at 3026-27.
55. The power to exclude non-members is a fundamental attribute of tribal sovereignty. F.
COHEN, supra note 9, at 252. The exclusion power provides an alternative theory for tribal
authority over non-member fee lands located on the reservation.
56. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (West 1983).
57. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3012-15.
58. Id. at 3012.
59. Id. at 3013.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3015.
62. Id. at 3016-17.
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the reservation. Moreover, Brendale creates legal uncertainty which
will hamper economic development and increase animosity between
tribal members and non-members. An extension of Brendale's checkerboard regulatory scheme to other forms of environmental regulation
on Indian reservations would have even worse consequences. However, a practical alternative exists to the jurisdictional wrangling
Brendale will cause: tribes and non-Indian governments can enter into
intergovernmental agreements to coordinate land use planning and
other forms of regulation.
A.

Brendale Is Inconsistent With the Fundamental Values of Land
Use Planning

1.

Justice White's Opinion:A Return to the Pre-Euclid Era

Justice White's position is at odds with fundamental values in land
use planning: that it be comprehensive and prospective. Instead of
having a governmental body determine the future of an area in accordance with a comprehensive plan,63 there are two bodies with divergent
zoning agenda operating independently in the same area.' 4 Under Justice White's approach, the county has exclusive authority over nonmember fee lands, while tribal authority remains undiminished over
tribal lands and the individual allotments held by members of the
tribe.6 5 The only mechanism Justice White provides for mediating differences between these agenda is a federal nuisance-type cause of
66
action Indian tribes may bring to prevent proposed development.
This ad hoe solution is inconsistent with comprehensive, prospective
planning. Tribes may bring suits against egregious uses, but realistically, such suits will not control smaller, incremental shifts in the texture of the reservation environment. Moreover, the right to sue
provides inadequate protection' for Indian interests because they are
judged by an alien culture. This is particularly apparent in light of the
63. The model for many state zoning enabling acts requires that zoning be carried out in
accord with a comprehensive plan. United States Dept. of Commerce, Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act § 3 (1926) reprinted in R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 41
(1981).
64. However, tribes should maintain their zoning authority over non-member lands when
there is no county or local zoning, because the total lack of restriction on such land could have
an even more serious impact on tribal interests. See Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian
Tribes, 670 F.2d 900"(10th Cir. 1982).
65. Justice White only denies tribal authority over fee lands, not tribal lands and allotted
lands. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3008. By contrast, Justice Blackmun noted the practical defects of
checkerboard zoning. Id. at 3023-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 3008.
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growing insensitivity in the federal judiciary to the unique aspects of
67
Indian culture.
Essentially, this sets land use on reservations back to the preEuclid6 8 era, when nuisance actions for overtly harmful uses were the
primary means of constraining the use of private property. Currently,
the need for comprehensive land use planning is more compelling than
ever before.69
2.

Justice Stevens' Approach: Limited Options in the Closed Area

Insofar as Justice Stevens denied tribal zoning authority in the open
area, his opinion suffers from faults similar to those of Justice White's
opinion. 70 No comprehensive, prospective planning is possible with
two governments pursuing different land use goals on reservations.
Even though Justice Stevens allows tribal zoning of non-member fee
land in the closed area, this may be a hollow victory for the Tribe. In
upholding tribal authority over non-member lands in the closed area,
Justice Stevens emphasized the "pristine" environment which the
Tribe has preserved in that area. 7 1 This raises doubts as to whether
the Tribe will maintain its power to zone if it allows non-members to
come into parts of the closed area to help develop its economic
potential.7 2
Tribes do not have the power to meaningfully "define the essential
character" 73 of an area on the reservation when any deviation from its
current pristine character could end their control of it. For nonIndian governments, the power to define a community is the power to
choose its future. 74 Allowing more intensive use of land in no way
diminishes the authority of a non-Indian local government over the
67. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988)
(allowing the completion of a road and timber harvesting on federal land which had religious
significance to Indians).
68. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision upholding the validity of zoning.
69. Initially, the legal justification for zoning was the growing congestion and complexity of
urban life in America. Id. at 386-87. Currently, the justification for comprehensive zoning is
even more powerful: our lives are even more complex and resources, including undeveloped land,
are becoming more scarce.
70. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
71. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994,
3013 (1989).
72. Id. at 3026 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. According to Justice Stevens, "[zoning is the process whereby a community defines its
essential character." Id. at 3009 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. The basic element in American planning has been "to develop a concept of the probable
future." N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND USE PLANNING § 1.06 (1988).
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land under its control.7 5 Thus, it can be flexible in its responses to
changing social and economic conditions. Tribes should also have a
right to change the reservation in response to changing circumstances,
especially in light of the United States' implicit promises of tribal freedom to grow and develop.7 6 Justice Stevens, however, gives tribes a
rather unenviable choice: they can have economic prosperity or maintain the powers of their tribal government and cultural identity-but
not both.
3.

ComprehensiveLand Use PlanningIs Important to Members and
Non-members on Reservations

Although largely unmentioned by the Court, one of the central
tensions in Brendale is between political accountability for land use
decisions and comprehensive planning.77 Brendale creates political
accountability for non-members in the open area because non-members can elect the county officials who will now make land use decisions concerning their property. Nevertheless, both members and
non-members continue to have a strong interest in having comprehensive land use planning on the reservation. The loss of comprehensive
planning on the reservation neither serves the interests of individual
landowners nor facilitates the responsible economic development of
the reservation.
Both Indian and non-Indian landowners suffer when land use is not
carried out in a comprehensive manner. A fundamental principle of
zoning is that although the value of private property is lowered by
restrictions on certain uses, the landowner receives a reciprocal benefit
by being certain of surrounding land use.7" When two governments
pursue different zoning agenda on the reservation checkerboard, indi75. For example,. Justice Sutherland paints an endearing picture of the residential
neighborhood surrounding the site at issue in the 1926 landmark zoning case. Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926). Today, that same neighborhood is primarily industrial and
commercial. ELLICKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 63, at 51.
76. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 68-75. Implicit in the treaties and treaty substitutes
with Indians was their right to change and grow in order to meet new demands. As the United
States Supreme Court wrote in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908): "it would be
extreme to believe that ... Congress... took from [the Indians] the means of continuing their
old habits, yet did not leave them the power to change to new ones."
77. Justice Stevens denied tribal authority to regulate non-member lands in the open area in
part because non-members constitute 80% of the population in the open area of the Yakima
reservation but cannot vote in tribal elections. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3016 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Cooperative agreements could create both political accountability and
comprehensive planning on reservations. See infra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
78. Pennsylvania Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 139-40 (1978) (Rehnquist,

J., dissenting).
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vidual landowners cannot be assured of getting reciprocal benefits for
the restrictions placed on their property.
Even though Indian and non-Indian cultures differ significantly,
there are numerous areas in which they have a common interest. Both
tribes and non-members have an interest in the health and safety of
reservation inhabitants, the quality of the reservation environment,
and the wise use of the limited resource of undeveloped land. The
uncertainty and probable confrontation caused by Brendale's uncoordinated approach to land use regulation promotes none of these values
on the reservation.
Brendale will cause great legal uncertainty and repetitious litigation
because it provides no clear test for determining what non-member
lands on the reservation remain under tribal authority.7 9 Rather than
a clear standard, courts applying Justice Stevens' approach have only
a list of factors to weigh in determining where tribes retain authority
over non-member lands on reservations.8 0 Indeed, once courts begin
the process of dividing reservations into areas where tribes do and do
not retain authority over non-member lands, there is no satisfactory
doctrinal line they can draw to delimit those areas.8 1 After Brendale,
any kind of unitary doctrine regarding tribal zoning authority over
non-member lands appears impossible.82
This resulting legal uncertainty will be detrimental to the reservation economy. The cost of such litigation will deplete tribal and local
non-Indian financial resources. Moreover, suitable non-member land
might not be developed because businesses might fear the costs and
delays of potential litigation. Fewer businesses on reservations mean
79. Like Justice Stevens, Justice Blackmun suggests that there may be areas on reservations
where tribes do not have authority over non-member lands. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3027 n.9
(Blackmun, J. dissenting). Thus a majority of five justices appears to favor splitting up
reservations into areas where tribes retain the power to zone non-member lands and areas where
they no longer have that power over non-member lands, Justice White's plurality opinion may
avoid this uncertainty by denying tribal authority over all non-member lands located on the
reservation. However, it creates another element of legal uncertainty by allowing tribes to bring
a federal cause of action to enjoin proposed uses on non-member lands which have a serious
impact on tribal interests. Id. at 3008.
80. Id. at 3012-16. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
81. For example, Justice Blackmun may suggest a bright line test for courts to use when he
mentions that the Yakima Tribe may not have adequate interests to justify zoning within towns
which primarily consist of non-member fee land. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3027 n.9 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). However, any court carefully weighing the interests of the parties would realize that
city boundaries are artificial lines which do not necessarily represent the relative interests of
different governments in regulating land use.
82. Mirande, Tribal Civil Authority within Reservation Borders and Brendale Y.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, WASHINGTON STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION 100TH ANNUAL MEETING AND CONVENTION 10-12 (Sept. 10-15, 1989).
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fewer jobs for Indians and non-Indians. Legal uncertainty will also
delay the responsible development of reservation resources.8 3
Prolonged litigation also intensifies the animosity between nonIndian communities and tribes. Communication and cooperation
toward common goals become impossible; both sides re-entrench for
the next controversy. Just as many states are recognizing the advantages of expanding the scope of planning to the regional and state-wide
level, Brendale moves in the opposite direction by fragmenting reservations into zoning checkerboards.8 4
B. Brendale's Effect on Forms of EnvironmentalRegulation Other
Than Land Use
An extension of Brendale's checkerboard regulatory pattern to
other forms of environmental regulation besides land use would cause
even more problems. After Brendale, states might renew their arguments in favor of their authority over non-member lands on reserva-

tions as a step toward the ultimate goal of exercising complete

regulatory control over reservations.8 5 Two methods of analyzing
Indian authority to impose such regulations exist after Brendale:
employing the second Montana exception as modified by Brendale or
following Justice Stevens' "power to exclude" analysis in Brendale.
1.

Tribes Should Be Able to Impose Environmental Regulations
Other Than Land Use on Non-Member Lands Under the
Second Montana Test

In Brendale, Justice White and Justice Blackmun hotly contested
the scope of the second Montana exception. 6 Under Justice White's
83. For example, legal uncertainty over Indian reserved water rights has caused prolonged
litigation and has impeded sound planning and development of water resources. Getches,
Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to Pragmatism, 58 U. COLO. L.
R V. 515, 517 (1988).
84. Diminishing natural resources and recognition of the regional scope of the problems
which land use planning should address have prompted planning on regional and state-wide
levels. Sixteen states have passed one or more state-level land use control laws and 37 states have
statutes authorizing zoning controls at the county level. WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at §§ 160.01.02. For a discussion of Oregon's bold example of statewide planning (Oregon Planning Act of
1973, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.005-.850.), see WILLIAMS, supranote 74, §§ 160.15-160.26. For a
recent article extolling "regionalism" in the Puget Sound area, see The Peirce Report, Seattle
Times, Oct. 4, 1989, at A4.
85. For example, in Washington Dep't of Ecology v. United States EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th
Cir. 1985), the State of Washington claimed that it had authority to impose its hazardous waste
program over non-Indian fee lands on reservations, and that therefore, for consistency's sake, the
State should be able to impose its program over the entirety of reservations.
86. Under Justice Blackmun's broad reading of the second Montana exception, tribes would
have authority to impose environmental regulations over the whole reservation, regardless of
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narrow reading of the second Montana exception, tribal authority over
non-member lands "depends on the circumstances''87 an extremely
vague pronouncement. Following Justice White's reasoning in
Brendale closely, a court could conclude that tribal environmental regulation would be unworkable because under the second Montana
exception a tribe would have authority over environmentally hazardous situations on non-member lands for as long as they pose a threat
to the tribe. Once the threat diminished, a tribe would lose the power
to regulate the situation. Following Justice White's approach in a
mechanical fashion, a court could give a tribe the right to sue in lieu of
the right to regulate.88
Even under Justice White's narrow reading of the second Montana
exception, consideration of the "circumstances" indicates that tribes
should generally have the authority to impose environmental programs over the whole reservation. First, regulation of the environment on non-member lands should fall within the second Montana
exception because it is a matter which has an impact on the political
integrity, economic security and the health and welfare of tribes.8 9 The
loss of environmental control can seriously undermine the cultural and
political integrity of the tribe by minimizing a tribe's ability to determine its own future. 90 A slow deterioration of environmental quality
on the reservation caused by unregulated activity on non-member
lands could limit the viable options of a tribal government. For example, if water quality deteriorates beyond a certain point on a reservation, fishing, cultural, recreational, and agricultural uses may become
impossible. 9 Loss of tribal authority over non-member lands can also
affect the economy and health of a tribe. Indian reservations contain
rich mineral deposits and large amounts of oil, gas and low-sulfur
land ownership. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S.Ct.
2994, 3021-22 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Similarly, under the broad reading that other
federal courts have given to the second Montana exception, tribes would also have authority to
impose environmental regulations over the whole reservation. See supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text. However, after Brendale the scope of the second Montana exception has
been narrowed because only Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall supported a broad
reading of the exception.
87. Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3007.
88. Id. at 3008.
89. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981).
90. Federal Indian policy favors tribes determining their own future. See H.R. Doc. No. 363,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
91. Tribes have a strong interest in regulating both the quantity and quality of water on
reservations. Water is important for the economic prosperity of nearly all Indians and central to
their culture and religion. Getches, supra note 83, at 515-16.

430

Regulation of the Reservation Environment
coal.9 2 Development of these resources is important to Indian tribes
for improving their economic situation. The potential impact on
Indian health and welfare which development of these resources can
cause greatly exceeds the effects of subdivisions such as those at issue
in Brendale.
Second, unitary management of environmental resources is critically important. Even more so than with land use, the impact of a
person's actions on resources such as water and air does not end at the
boundary of his or her property.9 3 Unitary management is also more
efficient from an administrative standpoint. Federal and tribal environmental regulation are the only ways to achieve unitary management on the reservation because state governments lack authority to
regulate tribal trust lands or allotted lands held in trust.9 4
Third, giving tribes the right to sue to enjoin environmentally hazardous activities is an inadequate substitute for environmental regulatory authority.9 5 Discovery of illegal dumping and enforcement
against offenders by state agencies might be slow on many reservations
because of their remoteness. 96 Tribal management of environmental
programs is likely to be more effective because of tribal proximity to,
and self-interest in, possible problems.
Finally, Indians will effectively protect the environment. 97 Unlike
modem Western culture, which has predominantly viewed the environment in terms of the economic gains which accompany the development and exploitation of natural resources, the environment has
deep spiritual significance for Indians. 98 Even if a tribe was tempted to
compromise the environment, there are adequate checks to prevent
92. Du Bey, Tano & Parker, Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste
Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449, 454 (1988).
93. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
94. Du Bey, Tano & Parker, supra note 92, at 474.
95. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
96. A survey commissioned by the EPA counted 1196 hazardous waste generators or sites
with hazardous waste activities in or around 25 Indian reservations. Council of Energy Resource
Tribes, Inventory of Hazardous Waste Generatorsand Sites on Selected Indian Reservations, 24
(July 1985).
97. See Letter from Professor Ralph W. Johnson to Lee M. Thomas, Administrator for the
Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 18, 1988) (refuting vague allegations of Indian disregard
for the environment in Letter from Ken Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, to Lee M.
Thomas (Mar. 4, 1988)) (both on file with Washington Law Review).
98. The close relationship which Native Americans have with the natural world "forms the
core of what might be called, for want of a better nomenclature, the Indian religious experience."
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1331 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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disastrous results.99 Therefore, even under Justice White's narrow
interpretation of the second Montana exception, the "circumstances"
dictate that tribes should have the power to impose other forms of
environmental regulation on non-member fee lands located on
reservations. lO
2.

Application of Justice Stevens' Approach to Other Forms of
EnvironmentalRegulation Also Has Shortcomings

The shortcomings of following Justice Stevens' analysis for other
environmental programs are nearly identical to its shortcomings for
land use. 0 l' Moreover, tribes might respond to Brendale by creating
environmental regulations which cover non-member lands in a quick,
haphazard fashion in order to strengthen their case for environmental
regulatory authority over non-members because the long-standing
exercise of tribal power was one of the principal reasons Justice Stevens concluded that the Yakima Tribe retained its authority over nonmember lands in the closed area."' Tribal environmental regulation
would gain more credibility if it were applied only after prolonged
study and a searching evaluation of actual tribal interests.

III.

COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS: A PROMISING
ALTERNATIVE TO PROLONGED LITIGATION

Post-Brendale litigation will be neither an economical nor an efficient way to settle the issue of who has zoning authority over nonmember fee lands on reservations. 10 3 Contrary to Justice White's opin99. Congress has set up standards tribes must meet before they can assume regulatory
authority for several federal pollution programs. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1987, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377(e) (West Supp. 1989). EPA's role in assisting tribes to
develop environmental programs should also diminish fears that tribes will destroy the
reservation environment. EPA Policy, supra note 23.
100. Even if a tribe has authority over non-member lands under the second Montana
exception, courts may further balance tribal and county or local interests to determine whether
there should be concurrent environmental regulation. Justice Stevens was favorably disposed to
concurrent zoning authority, even suggesting its application to the closed area. Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 3013 n.3 (1989)
(Stevens, J. concurring). However, without some cooperation between tribes and local nonIndian governments (see infra notes 105-19 and accompanying text), concurrent authority will
inevitably undermine the regulatory scheme of both governments, because the more stringent of
the regulations would control. See Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3026 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
101. See supra notes 70-76, 79-83 and accompanying text.
102. See T. Weaver, Whiteside Case: Its Implications 22 (1989) (on file with Washington Law
Review) (recommending among other things that tribes impose environmental regulations
quickly over the whole reservation in order to preserve their authority).
103. For a discussion of the legal uncertainty created by Brendale and its negative effects, see
supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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ion, a legislative solution to this problem is also unlikely."° A practical alternative exists for both tribes and non-Indian governments:
cooperative agreements." 5 The most fundamental advantage of cooperative agreements is that they allow comprehensive management of
resources such as land. Comprehensive management of resources is
the best way to assure that economic development does not severely
compromise the reservation environment.
There are other advantages to cooperative agreements which are no
less important. First, cooperative agreements foster political accountability for decisions. 0 6 Tribal members are represented by their leaders and both tribal members and non-members can vote in local or
county elections. Second, rather than having the federal judiciary
decide what interests are important to Indians in open areas, 0 7 tribes
can define their own interests and pursue them in negotiations. Third,
when communication between Indians and non-Indians reveals that
they have common interests, the long-standing misunderstandings
between the two groups may begin to dissolve. Fourth, a tribe may
benefit by working with a larger, more experienced administrative
body. Such an association would reduce administrative costs. Moreover, tribal members who act in concert with local government may
themselves develop those technical and managerial skills necessary to
implement programs. These skills are critical for tribes if they are to
realize the goal of self-government in the modern world.
In Washington State, the Swinomish Tribe and Skagit County are
currently working on an agreement to coordinate land use planning in
and around the Swinomish Indian Reservation."0 This agreement
will provide an excellent model for resolving land use conflicts
104. Politically, legislation giving Indians authority over land use throughout the reservation
would be unpopular since it would mean putting non-Indians under the control of Indians. See
supra notes 22, 77 and accompanying text. Congress could make such legislation more politically
palatable by tailoring its laws so as to give Indians authority over those portions of Indian
reservations where they have a strong interest in regulating land use. However, it would be
difficult for Congress to weigh the interests of tribes and local governments in exercising their
zoning authority on every reservation.
105. In particular, the atmosphere in Washington State is favorable for cooperative

agreements. See Centennial Accord between the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in
Washington State and the State of Washington (Aug. 4, 1989) (embodying an agreement to

address issues of mutual concern through government-to-government relations) (dn file with
Washington Law Review). Legal authority for cooperative agreements is provided by WAsH.
REV. CODE §§ 39.34.010-.920 (1989).
106. See supra notes 22, 77 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
108. See Northwest Renewable Resources Center, Indian Land Tenure and Economic
Development Project: Phase I (June 1987) (on file with Washington Law Review). Northwest

Renewable Resources Center [hereinafter N.R.R.C.], a non-profit corporation committed to
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through cooperative problem solving. After a long process of developing working relationships and defining interests, the parties took a
novel approach to the jurisdictional issue on the reservation-they set
it aside.I19 Instead, the parties concentrated on creating a coordinated
regional planning process in the interests of the Tribe and the
County. ' The parties are making significant progress on the substantive aspects of the agreement. An Advisory Planning Board, representing both the Tribe and the County, has put together a joint
comprehensive plan, which has been approved by both govern-

ments.' l l The Swinomish Tribe and Skagit County are currently
developing several procedural techniques to help administer their
coordinated land use program.' 12 Once fully implemented, the Swinomish Tribe/Skagit County Agreement will provide an exemplary
13
alternative to the jurisdictional patchwork created by Brendale.
The Swinomish Tribe/Skagit County Agreement is only the beginning. Tribes and counties can enter into negotiations on a variety of
issues. Unlike courts, which are constrained to decide only on the
issues before them, negotiators can link numerous issues so that each
side has greater flexibility in obtaining its objectives." 4 In addition to
land use, other forms of environmental regulation on reservations
might be the subject of a cooperative agreement between a tribe and
resolving natural resource disputes through negotiation and alternative dispute resolution, has
been instrumental in forming this agreement.
109. Memorandum of Understanding for Establishing a Coordinated Tribal/County
Regional Planning Program between The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community and Skagit
County app. D (providing that "[n]othing in this agreement shall limit or waive the regulatory
authority or jurisdiction of either party").
110. One sign that jurisdiction is of secondary importance in this agreement is that it
recognizes the fact that the Tribe has an interest not only in land use on the reservation, but also
areas beyond the exterior boundaries of the Swinomish Indian Reservation. Memorandum of
Understanding for Establishing Procedures for Administering a Coordinated Land Use Planning
Program between the Swinomish Tribal Community and Skagit County 1 (July 24, 1989)
(working draft) (on file with Washington Law Review).
111. Id. at3.
112. These include a mandatory consultation process, dispute resolution mechanisms and an
on-going review process. Id. at 4.
113. The agreement is expected to be completed in May, 1990. Telephone Interview with
Shirley Solomon, Project Director, N.R.R.C., (Jan. 2, 1990) (notes on file with Washington Law
Review).
114. As one commentator noted, negotiators are "often limited only by their creativity."
Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through IntergovernmentalAgreements, in INDIAN WATER 1985
25, 44 (1986). A good example of such linkage is the recent agreement involving the Puyallup
Tribe. In exchange for the relinquishment of land claims, the tribe received among other things
land, a cash settlement, programs for job training and placement and a fisheries enhancement
program. See Agreement between the Puyallup Tribe of Indians, local governments in Pierce
County, the State of Washington, the United States of America, and certain private property
owners (Aug. 27, 1988) (on file with Washington Law Review).

Regulation of the Reservation Environment
non-Indian government. Even though tribes should have authority
over forms of environmental regulation besides land use under the second Montana exception, 1 many of them lack the administrative
infrastructure necessary to carry out environmental regulation on reservations. 1 6 Creating such an infrastructure may entail a huge commitment of scarce tribal resources. A cooperative agreement could
avoid this burden on tribal resources while providing that tribal and
state jurisdiction remain intact.1 17 Thus, tribes could wait until they
are both technically and financially capable to assume authority over
the reservation environment. This would be preferable to tribes
quickly imposing environmental regulations without regard to expense
or capability merely to preserve their authority over non-member
118
lands.
The road to cooperation may not be an easy one. Racial antagonism is still strong on and near many reservations. Moreover, tribes
might initially be suspicious about entering into negotiations. Historically, tribes have been more successful in court than at the bargaining
table.1 19 The unworkable results of the Brendale opinion, however,
mark a turning point at which the bargaining table becomes an attractive alternative.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Brendale is contrary to the fundamental values in land use planning.
A rational approach to planning, which treats undeveloped land as a
valuable resource, is impossible when two governments pursue different land use agenda on the reservation. The resulting legal uncertainty
will hamper much needed economic development on the reservation.
In particular, tribal interests are inadequately served by merely having
the right to sue. While Brendale does give some non-members the
right to elect local officials who make land use decisions regarding
their land, these non-members lose the important benefits of comprehensive land use planning. There are compelling reasons not to extend
the results of Brendale to other forms of environmental regulation.
115. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
116. Telephone Interview with Shirley Solomon, Project Director, N.R.R.C. (Dec. 28, 1989)
(notes on file with Washington Law Review).
117. For an example of preserving the jurisdictional status quo, see supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
119. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long as Water Flows,or GrassGrows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That? 63 CALIF. L.
REv. 601, 608-12 (1975) (discussing the inequities of treaty negotiations between the United
States and tribes).
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A cooperative approach to this problem may be the best way of
avoiding the regulatory muddle caused by Brendale. Resources, such
as land, can be effectively and rationally developed through cooperative problem solving. Moreover, the uneasy neighbors on reservations-Indians and non-Indians-may have better relations once they
recognize their common interests and have a greater understanding of
their cultural differences.
Craighton Goeppele
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